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Jacob M. NebelI. INTRODUCTION
How should governments decide between alternative taxation schemes, en-
vironmental protection regulations, infrastructure plans, climate change
policies, health care systems, and other policies? One kind of consider-
ation that should bear on such decisions is their effects on people’s well-
being. The most rigorous methodology for evaluating such effects is the
“social welfare function” (SWF) approachoriginating in the work of Abram
Bergson and Paul Samuelson and further developed by Kenneth Arrow,
Amartya Sen, and other economists.1 Matthew Adler’s Measuring Social
Welfare is an introduction to this methodology.
This review essay focuses on what Adler identifies as two key tools of
the SWFmethodology. Thefirst is ameasure of well-being. Thismeasure is
a function that takes an outcome and returns a list of numbers—a well-
being vector, as Adler calls it—that represents the distribution of well-being
in that outcome. Each component in the list—each well-being number, as
Adler calls it—represents a person’s lifetime well-being in that outcome.
Outcome x is assigned well-being vector wðxÞ 5 ðw1ðxÞ, w 2ðxÞ, : : : , wnðxÞÞ,
where wi(x) is the well-being number that represents person i’s well-being* A review of Matthew D. Adler, Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2019), pp. 334, $99.00 (cloth). Page citations in the text are to this
book. Thanks to Kara Dreher, Orri Stefánsson, Trevor Teitel, and especially Matthew Adler
for helpful comments.
1. Abram Burk (Bergson), “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Econom-
ics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 52 (1938): 310–34; Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Eco-
nomic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947); Kenneth Joseph Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951); Amartya Sen, Collective Choice
and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970).
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572 Ethics April 2021in outcome x. The second tool is a rule for ranking these well-being
vectors. This rule—which we can think of as the SWF itself—will tell us
how to compare any two well-being vectors. Put together, these tools let
us compare outcomes by comparing their well-being vectors. Given any
two outcomes, we apply the well-being measure to obtain their well-being
vectors. Then we use the rule for ranking those vectors to determine which
is better.
So described, the SWF methodology may appear to be of interest
only to welfarist consequentialists, who believe that the rightness of acts
depends only on the goodness of their outcomes, and that the goodness
of outcomes depends only on their distributions of welfare. Indeed, Ad-
ler explicitly characterizes the SWF approach as both welfarist and con-
sequentialist (7). But, I believe, the SWFmethodology should be ofmuch
broader interest. Even if welfare is not all that matters, it does matter. We
can think, without being welfarists, that if one outcome’s distribution of
well-being is better than another’s, then the one outcome is better than
the other in one important respect—namely, with respect to the value of
well-being. And we can think, without being consequentialists, that the
comparison of outcomes with respect to this value is sometimes relevant
to what we ought to do. (In this spirit, when I say that one outcome is bet-
ter than another, this should be understood to mean only that it is better
with respect to the value of well-being.)
Adler’s central aim is to explain the power, flexibility, and normative
foundations of the SWF methodology in an accessible way. A secondary
aim is to argue that the SWF methodology is superior to the method of
cost-benefit analysis more widely used by policy makers. The book hand-
ily achieves these aims. Adler offers a helpful overview of the SWF frame-
work, discusses its ethical presuppositions, highlights axiomatic choice
points for deciding between different types of SWFs, applies the SWF
framework to a practical case study, proposes an institutional role for
the SWF framework, and suggests extensions of the SWF framework to
consider variable-population choices and individual responsibility. It will
be an invaluable resource for advanced undergraduates, graduate stu-
dents, and faculty working in philosophy, economics, law, political sci-
ence, and public policy.
In this essay, I question some ideas at the core of the SWF frame-
work that, if true, would have profound implications for moral and po-
litical philosophy, but which unfortunately have received little attention
from philosophers. These ideas have to do with the relation between the
two tools mentioned above: the well-beingmeasure and the rule for rank-
ing well-being vectors.
The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular
scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities,
there aremultiple scales that canbeused to represent the same information
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its ranking of distributions cannot depend on exactly which of these scales
we use. Adler and other theorists in the SWF tradition have used this idea
to derive highly restrictive constraints on the shape of the SWF. These con-
straints rule out seemingly plausible views about distributive justice and
population ethics.
I argue, however, that these constraints stem from a simple but in-
structive mistake. The SWF should not be applied to vectors of numbers
such as 1 and 2, but rather to vectors of dimensioned quantities such as 1 util
and 2 utils. This seemingly pedantic suggestion turns out to have far-
reaching consequences. Unlike the orthodox SWF approach, treating wel-
fare levels as dimensioned quantities lets us distinguish between real
changes in well-being and mere changes in the unit of measurement.
It does this without making the SWF depend on the scale on which wel-
fare is measured, and in a way that avoids the restrictive constraints on the
shape of the SWF. We’ll see how it does this, and why that is important, in
Section V. Until then, we’ll build up to my proposal by raising a problem
for Adler’s own preferred SWF (Sec. II), tracing the problem to these is-
sues about measurement (Sec. III), and drawing out those issues’ impli-
cations for other views about distributive justice and population ethics
(Sec. IV).
II. THE ATKINSON SWF
The aim of Measuring Social Welfare is not to defend any particular SWF.
Adler does, however, have a favorite kind of SWF, defended at length in
his previous book Well-Being and Fair Distribution,2 and it receives special
attention in Measuring Social Welfare.
Adler favors a kind of what he calls continuous-prioritarian SWF. (I’ll
just say “prioritarian,” taking the “continuous” part for granted.) This
kind of SWF evaluates distributions by first applying a transformation
to each person’s well-being, which I will call the priority weighting func-
tion. A person’s priority-weighted well-being is a strictly increasing and
strictly concave function of her well-being. This means that a person’s
well-being has positive but diminishing marginal priority-weighted value:
an increment of well-being always increases a person’s priority-weighted
well-being, but by less the better off she is. A prioritarian SWF adds up
everyone’s priority-weighted well-being and judges one distribution to
be better than another just in case the one has a greater sum of priority-
weighted well-being.2. Matthew Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
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SWFs satisfy the strong Pareto principle: if each person is at least as well
off in one distribution as they are in another, and at least one person
is better off, then the one distribution must be better than the other
(97). Second, prioritarian SWFs satisfy the principle of anonymity, which
requires any two distributions that are permutations of each other to be
equally good (97). Two distributions are permutations of each other if
they contain the same number of lives at each welfare level, with those
levels (possibly) rearranged among people. These two axioms—strong
Pareto and anonymity—are satisfied by all of the SWFs Adler considers.
Third, prioritarian SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle, which rec-
ommends any pure, gap-diminishing transfer of well-being from a better-
off to a worse-off person in which everyone else remains unaffected
(89). A pure, gap-diminishing transfer is one in which one person’s loss
equals the other’s gain and the difference between their welfare levels
is reduced. The Pigou-Dalton principle rules out the utilitarian SWF,
which compares distributions by their sums of well-being. It also rules
out what Adler calls sufficientist (often called “sufficientarian”) SWFs, which
give priority to the worse off only when they are below some sufficient
threshold of well-being.3 Unlike the utilitarian SWF, sufficientist SWFs
satisfy what Adler calls theminimal Pigou-Dalton principle: a pure, gap-
diminishing transfer from the better off to the worse off sometimesmakes
a distribution better, and a pure transfer from theworse off to the better off
never makes a distribution better (95).
Fourth, prioritarian SWFs satisfy the axiom of separability. Separabil-
ity says that the ranking of distributions cannot depend on the welfare of
unaffected individuals—that is, people whose welfare remains the same
in the distributions compared (89). Separability distinguishes priorita-
rian SWFs from paradigmatically egalitarian SWFs, on which the impor-
tance of benefiting a person depends not only on her own well-being
and the size of the benefit but also on how she fares relative to others.
For example, rank-weighted SWFs, such as the Gini SWF, evaluate distribu-
tions by multiplying each person’s welfare by a weight that depends on
her position in the distribution’s rank ordering of welfare levels, giving
greater weight to the worse off, and summing these weighted welfare lev-
els.4 Rank-weighted SWFs violate separability because the weight assigned
to a person’s welfare depends on the welfare of others, including unaf-
fected individuals (91).3. See Roger Crisp, “Equality, Priority, and Compassion,” Ethics 113 (2003): 745–63.
4. For a recent defense of rank-weighted SWFs, see Lara Buchak, “Taking Risks be-
hind the Veil of Ignorance,” Ethics 127 (2017): 610–44. I offer a critique of Buchak’s argu-
ment in Jacob M. Nebel, “Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance,” Ethics
131 (2020): 87–106.
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says that if one distribution is better than another, then a distribution re-
sulting from a sufficiently small change to the one must also be better
than the other (102). For example, if distribution (1, 3) is better than
(1, 2), then for some sufficiently small e, (12 e, 3) must also be better
than (1, 2). This implication is violated by the leximin SWF, which gives
absolute priority to the worst-off affected individual. Leximin judges
(1, 3) to be better than (1, 2) because the former is better for the only
affected individual. But it judges (12 e, 3) to be worse than (1, 2) be-
cause the latter is better for the worst-off affected individual. Continuity
also rules out the sufficientist SWFs that Adler considers, because they
give absolute priority to people below the threshold when their interests
conflict with those above it.
Table 1 shows which axioms are satisfied by each of the SWFs Adler
considers. The SWFs are listed in rows, axioms in columns. A bullet in a
cell indicates that the corresponding SWF satisfies the corresponding ax-
iom. Prioritarian SWFs are the only SWFs that satisfy all five of Adler’s
axioms: strong Pareto, anonymity, Pigou-Dalton, separability, and conti-
nuity (105).
There are infinitely many prioritarian SWFs, one for each possible
priority weighting function. For reasons we’ll see in Section III, Adler
favors a particular subfamily of prioritarian SWFs known as Atkinson
SWFs (154–55).5 Atkinson SWFs use a priority weighting function g(⋅)
with a particular shape, determined by a positive priority parameter g. When
g51, the priority weighting function is the natural logarithm: g ðwÞ5
log w. Otherwise, it has the form




For example, when g5 1=2, g ðwÞ5 2 ffiffiffiwp : priority-weighted well-being is
twice the square root of well-being. (Though there are infinitely many At-
kinson SWFs, I sometimes use “the Atkinson SWF” to refer to this entire
family.)
Figure 1 shows some examples of Atkinson priority weighting func-
tions. The horizontal axis represents well-being, the vertical axis priority-
weighted well-being. The solid (top) curve plots g(⋅) when g5 1=2. The
dashed (middle) curve plots g(⋅) when g5 1. The dotted (bottom) curve
plots g(⋅) when g5 2. All three curves have a positive but decreasing
slope: increments of well-being do less to increase priority-weighted
well-being from higher levels.5. Named after Anthony B. Atkinson, “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of
Economic Theory 2 (1970): 244–63.
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welfare levels. This is because, as Adler mentions in a footnote, “Atkin-
son SWFs do have a significant downside: they require well-being to be
non-negative or, in the case of g ≥ 1, strictly positive. The Atkinson g(⋅)
function is either undefined or, if defined, not both strictly increasing
and strictly concave with non-negative well-being numbers as inputs (or
with 0 as an input for g ≥ 1)” (155 n. 33). This is a serious problem for theFIG. 1.—Atkinson priority weighting functionsTABLE 1








Prioritarian • • • • • •
Utilitarian • • • •
Rank-weighted • • • • •
Leximin • • • • •
Sufficientist • • • •
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what it means for welfare to be negative.
Adler does not commit to a particular view about the zero level in
this book (156). But he mentions a standard approach in population
ethics, which is to define the zero level as the value of a neutral life : a life
that is neither worth living nor worth not living.6 It seems possible for a
life to be sufficiently bad—for example, because it is filled only with un-
mitigated suffering—that it is worth not living. Such a life would, on this
account of the zero level, have negative well-being.
Suppose that some people actually have lives that are worth not liv-
ing. Then, if the priority-weighted value of negative welfare is undefined,
the Atkinson SWF cannot be used to evaluate any choice whatsoever, be-
cause the sum of priority-weighted well-being will remain undefined no
matter what. And even if everyone actually has a life worth living, Atkin-
son weighting functions that are undefined over negative welfare would
lead the SWF to imply that it wouldn’t be worse to reduce people’s wel-
fare to the point where their lives would be worth not living. (Remember
that the prioritarian SWF is biconditional: one distribution is better than
another if and only if the one contains a greater sum of priority-weighted
well-being.) If we instead use an Atkinson weighting function that is de-
fined over negative welfare, and if some people have lives worth not liv-
ing, then the SWF either will recommend that wemake these people even
worse off (because the priority weighting function is strictly decreasing
over negative welfare—e.g., when g5 3) or will recommend any pure
transfer from the worse off to the better off among these people (because
the priority weighting function is strictly convex over negative welfare—
e.g., when g5 2=3). All of these results are inconsistent with prioritarian
convictions.
Adler might respond that Atkinson SWFs should just be restricted
to populations in which all lives are worth living and to choices in which
all lives would remain worth living no matter what.7 But that restriction
would not be enough. Suppose it might be true, for all we know, that
some lives are worth not living or would be if some policy were chosen.
Adler’s preferred method of applying an SWF under uncertainty is to
maximize expected social welfare. On this method, Atkinson SWFs will
have absurd implications similar to those above. So the Atkinson family
would need to be restricted to choices in which we are certain that all
members of society have lives worth living and would have such lives
no matter what. But there are no such choices: we cannot reasonably
be certain that every member of any contemporary society has and would6. Adler takes this approach in Well-Being and Fair Distribution, 219.
7. Adler seems to suggest this in ibid., 392.
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were such choices, a proponent of the SWF methodology would need
some other SWF to evaluate our other choices. That SWF would have
to violate one of the axioms that characterize the Atkinson family (one
of the five prioritarian axioms, or a sixth we’ll see in Sec. III). We might
then wonder why we shouldn’t just use that SWF to evaluate all choices,
and why we should accept Adler’s axioms when and only when all welfare
levels are certainly positive.
These problems could be avoided by reinterpreting the zero level in
such a way that it is impossible for a person’s well-being to be negative. For
example, suppose there is a worst possible life. Define the zero level to be
the value of such a life. Then it will be impossible for people to have neg-
ative well-being.
But, first, there does not appear to be any lower bound on the value
of lives. For any life, nomatter how bad, it seems possible for there to be a
life that is much worse—for example, by containing much more suffer-
ing. Second, Atkinson SWFs would have absurd implications regarding
variable-population choices if all possible lives were assigned nonnegative
welfare, no matter how bad. The most natural extension of prioritarian
SWFs to variable-population choices is to compare distributions by their
sums of priority-weighted well-being.8 If every possible life were assigned
nonnegative welfare, then Atkinson SWFs (so extended) would imply a
particularly implausible version of Derek Parfit’s repugnant conclusion.9
When g < 1, the Atkinson SWF would imply that, for any number of excel-
lent lives, there must be some number of lives whose existence would be
better, even though all of them would be just barely better than the worst
life people could possibly live. This is because, wheng < 1 and all lives have
positive welfare, all lives have positive priority-weighted value, so enough
lives of arbitrarily low well-being could contain a greater sum of priority-
weighted well-being. When g > 1, it would imply that, for any number of
horrible lives, theremust be some number of lives whose existence would
be worse, even though all of them would be wonderful. This is because,
when g > 1 and all lives have positive welfare, all lives have negative
priority-weighted value, so enough lives of arbitrarily high well-being8. By the “sum of priority-weighted well-being” in outcome x, I mean oni51g ðwiðxÞÞ,
where n is the number of people in x. This extension of prioritarianism is endorsed by Mat-
thew D. Adler, “Future Generations: A Prioritarian View,” George Washington Law Review 77
(2009): 1478. Adler now prefers a different view, which adds up each person’s priority-
weighted well-being after first subtracting the priority-weighted well-being of a neutral life,
which is set greater than the zero level (Matthew D. Adler and Nicolas Treich, “Priorita-
rianism and Climate Change,” Environmental and Resource Economics 62 [2015]: 279–308).
This avoids the problem I’m about to raise, but at the cost of violating the key axiom that
distinguishes Atkinson SWFs in variable-population cases. See note 24.
9. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
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being. These conclusions are unacceptable. (The g5 1 case avoids both
implications. But in variable-population cases, the logarithm function
does not satisfy the key axiom that distinguishes the Atkinson family from
other prioritarian SWFs. See note 18.)
Another approach would be to claim that the zero level is arbitrary
and to insist that we can always renormalize our scale so that everyone
in a distribution is assigned nonnegative welfare. To do this, the zero level
would have to be renormalized, in each choice, to the worst level of well-
being of any person in any available option.10 This procedure, however,
would have bizarre consequences for Atkinson SWFs, which require a
meaningful zero level (more on this in Sec. III).11 For example, let g5
1=2. Suppose that Ann and Bob have equally miserable lives. We can ei-
ther benefit both Ann and Bob by 1 unit or benefit Bob by 3 units. If
the zero level is normalized to the lowest welfare level in any available
outcome, the available distributions are represented by the vectors (1, 1)
and (0, 3). The Atkinson SWF, with g5 1=2, judges (1, 1) to be better, so
benefiting both people maximizes social welfare. Now suppose we have a
third option. We can make Ann’s and Bob’s lives much worse, by 100 units
each. This third option would result in the worst outcome for both, and
their lives would be equally bad, so it gets represented as (0, 0); benefiting
both then gets represented as (101, 101), and benefiting Bob alone gets
represented as (100, 103). Our SWF judges (100, 103) to be best: in the
three-option choice, benefiting Bob, rather than both, maximizes social
welfare. As this example shows, renormalizing the zero level to make all
welfare levels nonnegative would mean that the Atkinson SWF’s compar-
ison between two options can change with the introduction of a third op-
tion—one that is, in this case, Pareto-inferior to the others. Some people
think that adding or subtracting an option can sometimes affect the per-
missibility of choosing other options. But it seems absurd to think that the
addition of this kind of option—making everyone gratuitously worse off—
should have such an effect. If it could, then social decision makers could
bemanipulated to change their decisions, at some cost, by the addition or
removal of options that have no attraction whatsoever. That is an undesir-
able result.12
I conclude that Atkinson SWFs must be rejected. This conclusion
leaves us with some work to do, because there appear to be good reasons
for prioritarians such as Adler to favor the Atkinson SWF.10. Adler raises this possibility in Adler and Treich, “Prioritarianism and Climate
Change,” 294, 304 n. 44.
11. Consequences along these lines were pointed out to me by Orri Stefánsson.
12. On this kind of manipulability in decision theory, see John Quiggin, “Regret The-
ory with General Choice Sets,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8 (1994): 153–65.
580 Ethics April 2021III. INVARIANCE
Why, among prioritarian SWFs, does Adler favor the Atkinson family?
The answer has to do with the measure of well-being and brings us to
our main topic.
The first key tool of the SWF methodology, recall, is the well-being
measure w(⋅). This is a function that takes an outcome x and returns a
well-being vector wðxÞ5 ðw1ðxÞ, w2ðxÞ, : : : , wnðxÞÞ, where wi(x) represents
person i’s well-being in x. For example, suppose that outcomes x and y
contain two people, Ann and Bob. Suppose that wðxÞ5 ð2, 4Þ and
wðyÞ5 ð3, 3Þ, with Ann’s and Bob’s welfare levels listed in alphabetical or-
der.How exactly do these numbers represent these people’s welfare? And
what, if anything, is special about these numbers in particular?
The SWF framework has a standard answer. The well-being numbers
represent people’s well-being in the sense that relations between the wel-
fare levels of different people in different outcomes are mirrored by the
relations between the numbers assigned to those people in those out-
comes. The precise relations that are so represented depend on the mea-
surability and interpersonal comparability of well-being. For example, sup-
pose that well-being is only ordinally and intrapersonallymeasurable, with
no interpersonal comparability. Then the vectors assigned by w(⋅) to x
and y above—wðxÞ5 ð2, 4Þ and wðyÞ5 ð3, 3Þ—represent the facts that y
is better for Ann than x and that x is better for Bob than y. But we could
not extract from these vectors that, say, x is better for Bob than it is for
Ann, that Ann and Bob are equally well off in y, or that y is better for
Ann than x by as much as x is better for Bob than y. The fact that
wAnnðyÞ5 wBobðyÞ is an arbitrary feature of the numbers assigned by
wAnn(⋅) and wBob(⋅), if there is no interpersonal comparability of welfare
levels.
The distinction between relations that are and relations that are not
represented by the well-being measure can be made precise in the fol-
lowing way. There is not just one well-being measure w(⋅). There are
many, and no particular one of them is special. Some of these measures
conflict, or disagree, in the sense that they contain different information
about people’s well-being. For example, consider a well-being measure
w 0(⋅) that assignsw 0ðxÞ5 ð4, 12Þ andw 0ðyÞ5 ð3, 7Þ. Even with amerely or-
dinal scale of well-being with no interpersonal comparability, w(⋅) and
w 0(⋅) conflict. This is because w(⋅) assigns greater well-being to Ann in
y than to her in x, whereas w 0(⋅) does the opposite. But if we instead assign
w 0ðxÞ5 ð3, 12Þ and w 0ðyÞ 5 ð4, 7Þ, then w(⋅) and w 0(⋅) would contain the
same ordinal, intrapersonal information about these people’s well-being,
at least in these two outcomes.
Suppose two well-beingmeasures, w(⋅) and w 0(⋅), represent the same
information about people’s well-being—remaining open, for now, about
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measure we use. This idea is captured by what Adler calls “the Fundamen-
tal Principle of Invariance,”which says that an SWF should be “invariant to
admissible rescalings of the well-being measure” (43). An admissible re-
scaling of a well-being measure is just another well-being measure that
contains the same information as the original. An SWF is invariant to such
rescalings just in case, for any outcomes x and y, however the SWF ranks
vectors w(x) and w(y), it ranks w 0(x) and w 0(y) the same way, where w 0(⋅)
is an admissible rescaling of w(⋅). To see why this principle is important,
suppose that an SWF is not invariant to admissible rescalings of the well-
being measure. Then there must be some outcomes such that the SWF’s
comparison between those outcomes depends on which well-being mea-
sure is used, even among well-being measures that represent the exact
same information about people’s well-being. This seems indefensible, be-
cause the choice between w(⋅) and w 0(⋅) is arbitrary. It is like being willing
to run some distance when measured in miles but not when measured in
kilometers, or changing preferences between job offers depending on
whether one thinks of their salaries in dollars or in cents.
The Fundamental Principle of Invariance is, as Adler emphasizes,
one of the most important ideas in the SWF literature.13 Its precise impli-
cations depend on what kinds of information can meaningfully be repre-
sented by a scale of well-being. The less information there is to represent,
the stricter its requirements. This is because the set of admissible re-
scalings is larger if there are fewer relations that must be preserved for
two measures to agree. And if that set is larger, then it is harder for an
SWF to be invariant with respect to all measures in that set.
We can think of the different possible kinds of meaningful informa-
tion along a spectrum. On one extreme is the ordinal, purely intraper-
sonal scale mentioned above. This is an impoverished informational
framework for purposes of social welfare evaluation. The SWFmethodol-
ogy cannot get very far with a purely ordinal, intrapersonal scale of well-
being. Such a scale wouldmake it admissible to rescale each person’s well-
being measure by increasing the well-being numbers assigned to some
people, decreasing the numbers assigned to others, and shrinking or
stretching different people’s scales of well-being, so long as each person’s13. For helpful overviews of invariance conditions and their implications for social
welfare evaluation, see Claude d’Aspremont and Louis Gevers, “Social Welfare Functionals
and Interpersonal Comparability,” in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, ed. Kenneth J.
Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002), 1:459–541;
Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark, “Utility in Social Choice,” inHandbook of Utility Theory,
ed. Salvador Barberà, Peter J. Hammond, and Christian Seidl (Boston: Springer, 2004),
2:1099–1177; John Weymark, “Social Welfare Functions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Well-
Being and Public Policy, ed. Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), 126–59.
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are admissible, then the Fundamental Principle of Invariance implies
that they cannot affect the SWF’s rankings. But the only kind of SWF that
is invariant to such rescalings while satisfying the strong Pareto principle
is a serial dictatorship, in which the comparison between any two distribu-
tions is determined by the well being of some particular person (the dic-
tator), unless she is equally well off in both distributions, in which case
it’s determined by the well-being of some second person (the deputy dic-
tator)—and so on.14
On the other extreme is an absolute scale of well-being, on which
there is just a single welfare measure that accurately represents the avail-
able information about well-being. Measurement theorists sometimes
characterize counting and probability as using absolute scales.15 There
is a single number that represents how many pages there are in Adler’s
book, or the probability of a fair coin landing heads conditional on its
being flipped. No features of these numbers are arbitrary.16 This maxi-
mally rich informational framework would make the Fundamental Prin-
ciple of Invariance trivial: every SWF would satisfy it. But it seems absurd
to suppose that, for each person, there is a single number that represents
how well off she is. There is no privileged, natural unit of well-being.
In between ordinal measurability without interpersonal comparabil-
ity and absolute measurability with full interpersonal comparability are
many possibilities. Adler’s preferred informational framework is closer
to the absolute end of the spectrum. He takes there to be meaningful ra-
tios of different people’s welfare levels. If w(⋅) is an accurate representa-
tion of people’s well-being on a ratio scale, then wðxÞ5 ð1, 4Þ and
wðyÞ5 ð2, 2Þ imply that Bob is four times as well off as Ann in outcome
x, that y is twice as good as x for Ann, and that x is twice as good as y for
Bob. These relations are preserved by any common ratio rescaling of w(⋅):
any w 0(⋅) that differs from w(⋅) by multiplying everyone’s welfare by the14. As Adler points out (45), this result holds even if each person has a cardinal scale
of well-being, so that the SWF must only be invariant to individual-specific cardinal re-
scalings (i.e., positive affine transformations, as opposed to any strictly increasing trans-
formation). See R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction
and Critical Survey (Oxford: Wiley, 1957), 344; Louis Gevers, “On Interpersonal Compa-
rability and Social Welfare Orderings,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 75–89.
15. On counting, see Fred S. Roberts, Measurement Theory with Applications to Decision-
making, Utility, and the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 64.
On probability, see R. Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes, “Representational Measurement
Theory,” in Stevens’Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. Hal Pashler (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley,
2002), 1–41, 8. I suspect that many philosophers would disagree with Luce and Suppes and
maintain that the [0, 1] scale is an arbitrary but especially convenient normalization.
16. At least, on the standard definition of conditional probability as the ratio between
two unconditional probabilities. For critique, see Alan Hájek, “What Conditional Probabil-
ity Could Not Be,” Synthese 137 (2003): 273–323.
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ð3, 12Þ and w 0ðyÞ5 ð6, 6Þ, which still imply that Bob is four times as well
off as Ann in outcome x, that y is twice as good as x for Ann, and that x
is twice as good as y for Bob. A ratio scale also lets us compare ratios of dif-
ferences between welfare levels. The w(⋅) and w0(⋅) assignments both im-
ply that Bob’s gain from x coming about rather than y would be twice as
great as Ann’s loss. But, on a ratio scale, absolute differences or levels
are not themselves significant. There is nothing special about Bob be-
ing 3 units better off than Ann in x, or about them both having welfare
level 2. These values are not special in the sense that a welfare measure
can, as w 0(⋅) does, vary these numerical levels and differences while pre-
serving all of w(⋅)’s information.
If any common ratio rescaling of our welfare measure is admissible,





to whMultiplicative Invariance: For any well-being vectors w(x) and w(y),
and any k > 0: w(x) is at least as good as w(y) if and only if kw(x) is at
least as good as kw(y).17Multiplicative invariance implies, for example, that if our SWF ranks vec-
tor (2, 2) better than (1, 4), then it must also rank (6, 6) better than (3,
12), and more generally (2k, 2k) better than (1k, 4k) for any positive k.
The ranking of well-being vectors cannot change if everyone’s welfare
is multiplied by k.
Multiplicative invariance is widely accepted in the SWF literature. To
see its appeal, suppose we have some welfare measure w(⋅)—call it the
util measure—and our SWF ranks wðxÞ5 ðw1ðxÞ, : : : , wnðxÞÞ better than
wðyÞ5 ðw1ðyÞ, : : : , wnðyÞÞ. A util is just the value of some arbitrary life
that is mapped by wi(⋅) to level 1, or the difference in value between lives
that are mapped by wi(⋅) to levels that differ by 1. Now consider another
welfare measure w 0(⋅)—call it the shmutil measure, where 1 util is equal
to k shmutils. Suppose that, in violation of multiplicative invariance,
our SWF ranks w 0ðyÞ5 kwðyÞ5 ðkw1ðyÞ, : : : , kwnðyÞÞ better than w0ðxÞ5
kwðxÞ5 ðkw1ðxÞ, : : : , kwnðxÞÞ. Then it appears to matter whether wel-
fare is measured in utils or in shmutils. For w0(x) and w0(y) are just
the lists of x’s and y’s welfare levels in numbers of shmutils, whereas w(x)
and w(y) are their lists in numbers of utils. So, to figure out which of x
or y is really better, we must first figure out whether well-being should7. I take the name from Thierry Marchant, “Scale Invariance and Similar Invariance
itions for Bankruptcy Problems,” Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2008): 693–707. Adler
his principle “Invariance to Common Ratio Rescalings” (276). I have changed the
both for brevity and because, I will argue, the condition goes beyond invariance
at are intuitively mere rescalings of the welfare measure.
584 Ethics April 2021be measured in utils or in shmutils. That is ridiculous. It cannot plausibly
matter whether welfare is measured in utils or shmutils, just as it cannot
matter whether mass is measured in grams or kilograms. If we reject mul-
tiplicative invariance (while taking ratios of well-being levels to be mean-
ingful), then we seem forced to conclude that welfare is measurable on
an absolute scale, unlike even the most natural physical quantities with
which we are familiar, and that there is a single number, waiting to be dis-
covered, that represents your well-being. That seems implausible.
It turns out that Atkinson SWFs are the only members of the
prioritarian family that are multiplicatively invariant.18 That is why Adler
favors the Atkinson family of SWFs: he accepts multiplicative invariance
as well as prioritarianism. We have seen, however, that Atkinson SWFs
have unacceptable implications regarding miserable lives. There is some
irony in this. Atkinson SWFs assume a ratio scale of well-being, which re-
quires there to be a meaningful zero level. But Atkinson SWFs are un-
workable or implausible precisely when we try to take that level into ac-
count, by considering lives at or below it.19
Atkinson SWFs’ problems with negative well-being are instances of a
more general problem: there simply is no prioritarian SWF that is multi-
plicatively invariant and can handle both positive and negative welfare lev-
els.20 To see this, consider well-being vector (0, 0, 0, 0). Prioritarianism im-
plies (by continuity) that, for some negative welfare level 2w, (0, 0, 0, 0)
and (1, 2w, 0, 0) are equally good. Now double everyone’s welfare in
both distributions. Multiplicative invariance implies that (0, 0, 0, 0) and
(2, 22w, 0, 0) must also be equally good. The Pigou-Dalton condition
then implies that (2, 22w, 0, 0) can be improved by transferring a unit
of well-being from thefirst person to the third: (1,22w, 1, 0) is better than
(2,22w, 0, 0). (1,22w, 1, 0) can be similarly improved by transferring w
units of well-being from the fourth person to the second: (1,2w, 1,2w) is
better than (1,22w, 1, 0). So, by the transitivity of better than, (1,2w, 1,2w)
must be better than (0, 0, 0, 0). But since (0, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 2w, 0, 0) are
supposed to be equally good, so must (0, 0, 1, 2w) and (1, 2w, 1, 2w) by
separability, since the last two people have the same welfare in each pair of
distributions. By anonymity, (1,2w, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1,2w) are equally good.
So, by the transitivity of equal goodness, wehaveboth that (1,2w, 1,2w) and18. Except in variable-population cases when g5 1. The sum of priority-weighted well-
being, using the logarithm function, is as great in (1, 1) as it is in (1, 1, 1), but not as great in
(2, 2) as it is in (2, 2, 2).
19. Compare Charles Blackorby and David Donaldson, “Ratio-Scale and Translation-
Scale Full Interpersonal Comparability without Domain Restrictions: Admissible Social-
Evaluation Functions,” International Economic Review 23 (1982): 249–68, 253.
20. See Campbell Brown, “Prioritarianism for Variable Populations,” Philosophical
Studies 134 (2007): 325–61, for another proof and extensive discussion of this issue.
Nebel Utils and Shmutils 585(0, 0, 0, 0) are equally good and that the former is better—contradiction.
This shows that, with a domain that includes both positive and negative wel-
fare, prioritarian SWFs cannot be multiplicatively invariant.
We saw, in Section II, why a prioritarian SWF cannot plausibly be re-
stricted to domains in which all welfare levels are positive. Those who are
attracted to multiplicative invariance might see this as an easy argument
against prioritarianism. But I am reluctant to reject prioritarianism on
this basis. Even though some of the prioritarian axioms can be reason-
ably denied, they seem to me more ethically compelling than multiplica-
tive invariance. And, as we will now see, multiplicative invariance rules
out several other seemingly plausible SWFs. So even some opponents
of prioritarianismmay have reason to question multiplicative invariance.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MULTIPLICATIVE INVARIANCE
So far, it may seem as though multiplicative invariance is a niche issue in
the SWF literature that should be of concern only to prioritarians such as
Adler. But, in fact, it has wide-ranging implications for population ethics
and distributive justice, and it is deeply rooted in the SWF framework. I
draw out some of these implications in this section.
A. Levels
Multiplicative invariance implies that the only morally significant facts
about welfare levels are the ratios between them and how they compare
to the zero level—that is, whether they are positive or negative. But we do
not just categorize lives as good (worth living) or bad (worth not living).
Some lives are very good, wonderful, or barely worth living. Others are
very bad, utterly miserable, or nearly worth living. This information can-
not be cashed out entirely in terms of ratios of well-being levels. For ex-
ample, consider a wonderful life and a life that is barely worth living. It is
not at all obvious that, if we decrease these well-being levels by a factor of
n, the one life would remain wonderful and the other barely worth liv-
ing. Intuitively, if n is very large, the wonderful life would be reduced
to one that is barely worth living. Multiplicative invariance requires us
to ignore this information.
According to some SWFs, this kind of information can be morally
significant. The most obvious example is one we have already encoun-
tered: sufficientist SWFs. A sufficientist SWF gives priority—on some ver-
sions, absolute priority—to people who fall below a certain threshold level
of well-being. Unless this threshold is just the zero level, sufficientist SWFs
will violate multiplicative invariance.
To see this, suppose that we give some priority to the worse off only
when they are below some sufficiently wonderful level of well-being, which
is mapped by our individual well-being measure wi(⋅) to 50. Suppose that
586 Ethics April 2021we aggregate benefits above that threshold in a utilitarian fashion, giving
no priority to the worse off who are sufficiently well off. Table 2 depicts the
vectors assigned to four outcomes by a single well being measure w(⋅).21
The distributions on the left, those of x and y, are represented by
the vectors wðxÞ5 ð45, 45Þ and wðyÞ5 ð60, 30Þ. Our sufficientist SWF
judges x’s distribution to be better than y’s, because they contain the
same total well-being but Bob’s well-being is below the threshold and
is greater in x. The distributions on the right are those of x 0 and y 0, in
which both people’s welfare levels are doubled. Using the same well-
being measure w(⋅), these distributions are represented by the vectors
wðx 0Þ5 ð90, 90Þ and wðy 0Þ5 ð120, 60Þ. Our sufficientist SWF judges
wðx 0Þ5 ð90, 90Þ and wðy 0Þ5 ð120, 60Þ to be equally good because both
people are above the threshold and they contain the same total well-
being. This violates multiplicative invariance: w(y 0) is as good as w(x 0),
but wðy 0Þ=25 wðyÞ is not as good as wðx 0Þ=25 wðxÞ.22
Another violation of multiplicative invariance comes from views in
population ethics. According to critical-level utilitarianism, there is a fixed,
positive level of well-being—the critical level—below which a person’s ex-
istence makes things worse, even if her life is worth living.23 Critical-level
utilitarians evaluate distributions by first subtracting the critical level from
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Nebel Utils and Shmutils 587To see how critical-level utilitarianism violates multiplicative invari-
ance, consider table 3. Suppose the critical level is strictly between 1
and 10, and let a blank cell represent a person’s nonexistence. The left side
of the table compares distributionswðxÞ5 ð10Þ andwðyÞ5ð10, 1Þ; the right
side compares distributions wðx 0Þ5 ð100Þ and wðy 0Þ5 ð100, 10Þ, in which
everyone who exists is made ten times better off. Critical-level utilitarian-
ism, with a critical level between 1 and 10, judges w(x) to be better than
w(y) because the only difference between them is the addition of a person
in y below the critical level. Butw(x 0) will be worse thanw(y 0), because the
additional person in w(y 0) is above the critical level.24
We have seen two kinds of views that violate multiplicative invari-
ance by assigning moral significance to some welfare level other than
zero: sufficientist and critical-level views. Of course, these views face
problems of their own. My point is not that multiplicative invariance
must be false because one of these views is true. The point, rather, is that
these views are live ethical options. It is not obviously mistaken or con-
fused to care about whether people fall below some sufficient threshold
of well-being or critical level of existence. If, as Adler believes, there is
one meaningful and morally significant level of well-being—the zero
level—then why could there not be more? Why insist that the level at
which a life becomes worth living is morally significant, but that no other
level could possibly be similarly significant? Maybe these views should ul-
timately be rejected. But I do not think they should be rejected on the
grounds that, because they violate multiplicative invariance, they presup-
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We do not just regard some people as better off than others, or as being
made n times better off (if we make ratio comparisons between welfare
levels at all). We regard some as being much or only slightly better off
than others, or as being made much or only slightly better off. Like the
intuitive properties of lives at various welfare levels, this kind of informa-
tion cannot be cashed out entirely in terms of ratios. For example, sup-
pose that Ann is vastly better off than Bob. We do not think that, for
any n, if their welfare were decreased by a factor of n, Ann would remain
vastly better off than Bob. If n were sufficiently large that both welfare lev-
els were made extremely small, we would judge Ann to be only slightly
better off than Bob. And we might assign moral significance to these dif-
ferences, in a way that violates multiplicative invariance.
This kind of information may be especially relevant for an egalitar-
ian SWF. Larry Temkin suggests that the badness of inequality may not
be linear with respect to its size.25 For example, consider the distributions
in table 4. Suppose we judge wðxÞ5 ð0, 4Þ and wðyÞ5 ð1, 1Þ to be equally
good: though wðxÞ5 ð0, 4Þ has a greater sum of well-being, wðyÞ5 ð1, 1Þ
has it more equally distributed. Multiplicative invariance would require
that wðx 0Þ5 ð0, 100Þ and wðy 0Þ5 ð25, 25Þ then be equally good as well.
But we might judge the inequality in wðx 0Þ 5 ð0, 100Þ to be more than
25 times as bad as the inequality in wðxÞ5 ð0, 4Þ. So we might judge w(y0)
to be better than w(x 0), in violation of multiplicative invariance.
For another egalitarian example, Temkin also suggests that inequal-
ity matters more at lower levels of well-being: other things being equal,
a person’s complaint against being worse off than others is stronger the
worse off she is. Now consider the distributions in table 5. We might
judge wðxÞ5 ð210, 210Þ to be better than wðyÞ5 ð250, 100Þ on the
grounds that Ann is much worse off than Bob. But we might judge the
inequality in wðy 0Þ5 ð25, 10Þ to be much less bad than the inequality in
w(y) because Ann is so much less badly off in w(y 0). So, in the choice be-
tween wðx 0Þ5 ð21, 21Þ and wðy0Þ5 ð25, 10Þ, we might think it more25. LarryTABLE 4
Nonlinear Weighting of Egalitarian
Complaints
Ann Bob Ann Bob
w(x) 0 4 w(x 0) 0 100
w(y) 1 1 w(y 0) 25 25S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Nebel Utils and Shmutils 589important to benefit Bob so that he has a life worth living, despite the in-
equality in w(y 0).
More generally, egalitarian violations of multiplicative invariance are
commonly associated with “absolute” measures of inequality, on which
the magnitude of inequality depends only on the differences between
people’s well-being levels. On an absolutemeasure, adding some quantity
of well-being to each person can’t increase or decrease inequality, but
multiplying everyone’s well-being by a common factor can. These are
in contrast to “relative” measures of inequality, which are unaffected by
rescalings by a common factor but affected by common translations (i.e.,
addition or subtraction). Serge-Christophe Kolm influentially called the
absolute and relative measures “leftist” and “rightist,” respectively. He
motivated the use of absolute measures with the example of the May
1968 student protests and workers’ strike in France. The strike ended
with an agreement to increase everyone’s pay by the same percentage.
“Thus, laborers earning 80 pounds a month received 10 pounds more,
whereas executives who already earned 800 pounds a month received
100 poundsmore. The Radicals felt bitter and cheated; in their view, this
widely increased incomes inequality [sic].”26 One might hold a similar
view about proportional increases in well-being rather than income.
Egalitarians with an absolute measure of inequality, or even with an
intermediate measure that combines absolute and relative elements, will
reject multiplicative invariance, because multiplying everyone’s welfare
by a common factor can affect such measures. For example, in table 4,
they will judge the inequality in wðx 0Þ5 ð0, 100Þ to be greater than the
inequality in wðxÞ5 ð0, 4Þ. In the choice between wðxÞ5 ð0, 4Þ and
wðyÞ5 ð1, 1Þ they may prefer to double the sum of well-being in exchange
for the slight inequality in w(x). In the choice between wðx 0Þ5 ð0, 100Þ
and wðy 0Þ5 ð25, 25Þ, they may be unwilling to double the sum of well-
being in exchange for the (on their view) greater inequality in w(x 0).
For similar reasons, in table 5, they might prefer the equal distribution
wðxÞ 5 ð210, 210Þ to the vastly unequal wðyÞ5 ð250, 100Þ, while pre-
ferring the slightly unequal wðy 0Þ5 ð25, 10Þ, which ensures that Bob at26. Serge
(1976): 416–4TABLE 5
Stronger Complaints at Lower Levels
Ann Bob Ann Bob
w(x) 210 210 w(x 0) 21 21
w(y) 250 100 w(y 0) 25 10-Christophe K
2, 419.olm, “Unequal Inequalities. I,” Journal of Economic Theory 12
590 Ethics April 2021least has a life worth living, to wðx 0Þ5 ð21, 21Þ, in which both lives are
worth not living.
Again, my point is not that multiplicative invariance must be false
because some (partially) absolute measure of inequality is correct, or be-
cause the badness of inequality is not linear with respect to its size or is
worse at lower levels. The point, rather, is that these are live ethical op-
tions. I think it would be a mistake to rule them out on the grounds that,
because they violate multiplicative invariance, they require an absolute
scale or natural unit of well-being. For, as we’re about to see, they require
no such thing.
V. WELFARE AS A DIMENSIONED QUANTITY
We have seen that multiplicative invariance is quite restrictive: it is incon-
sistent with critical-level utilitarian, sufficientist, and some egalitarian
SWFs, as well as prioritarian SWFs if welfare levels can be negative. But
as we saw in Section III, multiplicative invariance appears to follow from
the widely accepted view that welfare is, at most, ratio-scale measurable.
There is no absolute scale or privileged unit of well-being. So we should
be able to shrink or stretch our scale of well-being without changing the
ranking of distributions, as multiplicative invariance implies. If our SWF
violates multiplicative invariance, then figuring out the correct ranking
of distributions requires us first to know whether well-being should be
measured in utils or shmutils or something else, as if one of these units
is uniquely correct. That is absurd.
There is something fishy about this argument from mere ratio-scale
measurability to multiplicative invariance.27 It is one thing to require
that, say, halving the unit of welfare measurement should not change
an SWF’s ranking of distributions. It is, intuitively, quite another thing
to require that doubling everyone’s welfare should not change the SWF’s
ranking, as in the examples we considered in Section IV. The SWFmeth-
odology appears unable to distinguish between these two cases. This in-
ability to distinguish between real changes in welfare and mere changes
of scale is observed by Amartya Sen in his groundbreaking work on the
informational basis of social welfare evaluation. Sen notes that “in all
cases of measurability-comparability frameworks discussed here (and
in other works), the invariance requirement covers both interpretations
[halving units and doubling welfare] since there is no natural ‘unit’ of
measurement of personal welfare.”2827. This is carefully spelled out in Morreau and Weymark, “Measurement Scales.”
28. Amartya Sen, “OnWeights andMeasures: Informational Constraints in Social Wel-
fare Analysis,” Econometrica 45 (1977): 1539–72, 1542. In response to this problem, Morreau
and Weymark (“Measurement Scales”) suggest a framework of “scale-dependent” social
Nebel Utils and Shmutils 591My aim in this section is to sketch an alternative picture of the
quantitative representation of well-being on which these two cases can
be distinguished, and on which violations of multiplicative invariance
do not require there to be an absolute scale or natural unit of well-being.
We can have an SWF that violates multiplicative invariance without insist-
ing that welfare is measurable on anything stronger than a ratio scale.
The appearance to the contrary, I think, stems from another assumption
that is deeply rooted in the SWF literature, which has to do with the val-
ues of the individual well-being measure.
The well-being measure w(⋅) takes an outcome x and returns a well-
being vector wðxÞ5 ðw1ðxÞ, : : : , wnðxÞÞ. What are the components of this
vector—that is, the values of individual i’s well-being measure wi(⋅)? They
are generally said to be real numbers (Adler calls them “well-being num-
bers”), and I have represented them accordingly in this paper so far.
On this orthodox view, w(x) and w(y) are vectors of real numbers, corre-
sponding to x’s and y’s distributions of welfare measured in (say) utils.
Let w 0ðxÞ5 kwðxÞ and w0ðyÞ5 kwðyÞ represent these same distributions,
but measured in shmutils. Violations of multiplicative invariance mean
that our SWF can rank x’s and y’s distributions in one way—say, x’s better
than y’s—when fed w(⋅)’s vectors of welfare-in-utils but in another way
when fed w 0(⋅)’s vectors of welfare-in-shmutils.
Why, though, should we treat the values of individual well-beingmea-
sures as real numbers? In statements of physical laws, such as “Force5
mass  acceleration,” we do not treat “mass” as standing in for a number.
It stands in for a dimensioned quantity, such as 5 kg. And dimensioned
quantities are not real numbers.
Why not? For one thing, the real numbers are closed undermultipli-
cation and addition.29 If dimensioned quantities such as 5 kg, 2 kg, and
3 kg were real numbers, then the product 5 kg  2 kg5 10 kg2 would
also be a real number. And so would the sum 10 kg213 kg. But the oper-
ation of adding mass to mass squared is not even defined. I am not deny-
ing, of course, that we can convert these dimensioned quantities to real
numbers—from quantities of mass to numbers-of-kilograms-of-mass—and
then multiply and add the resulting quantities: 5  2135 13. But thewelfare functionals (functions from profiles of individual well-being measures to social
orderings). On their approach, given a scale of well-being, there is a unique social welfare
funtional. But if we use a different scale, we need to use a different social welfare functional
as well. This allows each social welfare functional to violate conditions like multiplicative
invariance, without implying that there is some single correct scale of welfare. But it seems
to abandon the project of formulating a single function that ranks distributions no matter
which of some informationally equivalent scales we use to represent those distributions. My
proposal avoids this problem.
29. This argument is given by George W. Hart, Multidimensional Analysis Algebras and
Systems for Science and Engineering (New York: Springer, 1995).
592 Ethics April 2021resulting sum would not represent any dimensioned quantity. (One way
to see this is that, if we instead multiplied and added numbers-of-grams-of-
mass, we would get 5,000 2,00013,0005 10,003,000, which relates to
the earlier sum in no interesting way: 10,003,000=13 ≈ 769,461:54.)
Another reason to distinguish dimensioned quantities from num-
bers is to respect requirements of dimensional homogeneity: we can only
compare quantities of the same dimension.30 If dimensioned quantities
such as 5 kg and 4 m were real numbers, then one would be greater than
the other or they would be the same. But no quantity of mass is greater
than, less than, or equal to any quantity of length. Again, we can, of course,
compare an object’s number-of-kilograms-of-mass with its number-of-
meters-of-height, but the former isn’t a mass and the latter isn’t a length.
The same considerations, I suggest, apply to quantities of welfare.
There is no quantity of welfare that is the sum of Ann’s welfare and
the product of Bob’s and Cat’s welfare, because the operation of adding
welfare squared to welfare is undefined. And no one’s welfare is greater
than, less than, or equal to their height, or to p. Just as physical laws re-
late dimensioned quantities to one another—for example, force to mass
and acceleration, none of these being numbers—we should expect the
SWF to relate dimensioned quantities to one another: namely, social wel-
fare to the welfare of individuals.
What are these dimensioned quantities, if not real numbers? Take a
particular example, such as 1 kg. One simple answer is that a kilogram is a
particular equivalence class of objects under the relation of having equal
mass: namely, the set of objects that have the same mass as the standard
kilogram.31 This answer won’t quite do. For suppose that nothing weighs
exactly p kg, and that nothing is exactly p2 m long. Then both equivalence
classes are the empty set, so p kg would be identical to p2 m. This can be
avoided by taking the equivalence classes to be sets of possible objects (or
object-world pairs) andby assuming that every quantity along each dimen-
sion can be instantiated. There is no assumption that these quantities are
observable. I wish to remain neutral about other metaphysical questions
about dimensions and dimensioned quantities. For example, are there
fundamentally such quantities as 5 kg, or are there only fundamentally
such relations as having greater mass or betweenness of mass?32 I suspect
that any answer to these questions has to be able to do the work that we
need from dimensioned quantities for present purposes.30. This is emphasized by Henry E. Kyburg, “Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers,”
Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 377–410.
31. See ibid.
32. See Shamik Dasgupta, “Absolutism vs. Comparativism about Quantity,” Oxford
Studies in Metaphysics 8 (2013): 105–50.
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erations that can be performed on dimensioned quantities. Only quan-
tities of the same dimension can be added, subtracted, or compared. We
can multiply quantities of arbitrary dimensions to form quantities of yet
other dimensions. We can also divide such quantities. The ratio of two
quantities of the same dimension is a dimensionless number. A number
divided by a dimensioned quantity yields a “reciprocal” dimensioned
quantity. For example, the number 1 divided by 1 m yields 1 m21. I will
assume that, for any possible quantity x with dimension [x] and any pos-
itive integer n, there is a possible quantity x1=n with dimension ½x1=n.
Such a quantity, if multiplied by itself n times, yields x.33
My suggestion is twofold. First, the values of the well-being measure
w(⋅) should be vectors of dimensioned quantities rather than of num-
bers—for example, (1 util, 2 utils) rather than (1, 2). And, second, our
SWF must be properly expressed to reflect the proposed dimensionality
of welfare. Some SWFs may need no adjustment—for example, the utili-
tarian SWF, which simply adds up quantities of welfare. Others may re-
quire very simple adjustment. For example, the critical-level utilitarian
SWF subtracts the value of a critical level c from each person’s well-being
before adding up these critical-level-adjusted values. c is often identified
as a number, but it makes no sense to subtract a dimensionless number
from a dimensioned quantity. cmust therefore be a quantity of well-being,
rather than a number. The dimensionality of welfare, however, may ap-
pear to pose a problem for other SWFs.
After noting the Atkinson SWF’s problems with negative well-being,
Adler mentions a family of prioritarian SWFs that play nicely with both
positive and negative welfare: the family of Kolm-Pollak SWFs (155 n. 33).
Kolm-Pollak SWFs use a negative exponential priority weighting function:
g ðwÞ52e2lw ,
where e is the base of the natural logarithm and l is positive. Figure 2
shows an example of a Kolm-Pollak priority weighting function. Kolm-
Pollak SWFs satisfy the axioms of prioritarianism over both positive and
negative welfare levels (they do not even require a fixed zero level of
well-being). But Adler rejects them because they violate multiplicative
invariance.33. I follow David H. Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement (New York: Academic,
1971), 1:460: “One just never hears physicists speak of dimensions such asM 1=113. But that
objection has little to do with roots as such; the problem is that one does not hear mention
of M113 either. As we pointed out, only very small integers arise in practice. To our knowl-
edge, no one has yet provided an axiomatization that imposes any limitation on the mul-
tiplying and dividing of dimensions, nor do we know of any explanation in physics for these
limitations.”
594 Ethics April 2021I have suggested that w is a dimensioned quantity. And l is generally
treated as a number. Then the exponent 2lw must be a dimensioned
quantity. But what does it mean to raise a number (e) to the power of
a dimensioned quantity? Exponents cannot have dimension. Or consider,
for another example, the Atkinson SWF with g5 1: g ðwÞ5 log w. It
makes no sense to take the logarithm of a dimensioned quantity, such
as 5 g: there is no exponent such that raising the base (a number) to that
exponent will yield 5 g.34
There is a simple solution to this apparent problem: we should in-
terpret l not as a real number but as a dimensional constant, like critical-
level utilitarianism’s c. Where [w] is the dimension of well-being, lmust
have dimension [w]21 (reciprocal well-being). Then the exponent 2lw
will be a number, because any quantity of utils21 multiplied by any quan-
tity of utils is a number. (Some may prefer l to have dimension [w] and
to rewrite the priority weighting function as g ðwÞ52e2w=l, where the
function gives greater priority to the worse off as l approaches zero.)FIG. 2.—Kolm-Pollak priority weighting function34. This argument is made by Chérif F. Matta et al., “Can One Take the Logarithm or
the Sine of a Dimensioned Quantity or a Unit? Dimensional Analysis Involving Transcen-
dental Functions,” Journal of Chemical Education 88 (2011): 67–70.
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a dimensional constant within the argument of the logarithm.35
I am not suggesting that there is such a dimensional constant—only
that Kolm-Pollak SWFs require one if welfare levels are dimensioned
quantities rather than numbers. Perhaps it is a disadvantage of an SWF
that it posits additional dimensional constants that we have no indepen-
dent reason to believe exist.36 Wemight disfavor such an SWF on grounds
of simplicity. But simplicity is just one theoretical consideration among
others. If a dimensional constant is required by our most ethically attrac-
tive SWF, that may provide sufficient reason to accept it. Compare the
case of physical laws. We posit a gravitational constant of dimension
½force ⋅ ½length2 ⋅ ½mass22 because we know that the gravitational force
between two bodies is proportional to the product of their masses and
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. The
gravitational constant is needed for force to be a dimensionally consis-
tent function of these variables. We cannot reasonably have as much con-
fidence in any particular SWF as we have in a physical law. But it would be
unreasonable, I think, to reject an ethically attractive SWF purely on the
grounds that it requires a dimensional constant.
If an SWF is properly expressed as a function of dimensioned quan-
tities of welfare, then its rankings will not depend on the unit in which wel-
fare is measured. Take the Kolm-Pollak SWF. Suppose we initially mea-
sure welfare in utils. Let w 5 1 util and l5 1 util21. Then g ðwÞ52e1.
If we instead measure w in shmutils, so that w 5 k shmutils, this will
not change the value of g(w): k shmutils  1 util21 5 k shmutil  1=k
shmutils21 5 1, so we still have g ðwÞ5 2e1. This is because l is not a
number but a dimensional constant. It has the same value regardless of
the unit in which it is measured: 1 util21 5 1=k shmutils21. This ensures
that the Kolm-Pollak SWF is dimensionally invariant—that is, that its truth
does not depend on the unit of measurement.
Let me give another example that does not involve well-being. Sup-
pose Ann and Bob each plant two trees, which start at 1 m tall and dou-
ble in height each year until they are chopped down. Ann and Bob get to
decide when to chop down their trees, and each aims to have the greatest
average tree height. Ann grows one tree for a year and the other tree for
two years. Bob grows both of his trees for a year and nine months. Bob’s
trees will end up, on average, taller than Ann’s. Suppose next that Ann
grows one tree for twelve years and the other for twenty-four years. Bob35. An additional dimensional constant is also needed, in both the Kolm-Pollak and
logarithmic cases, to ensure that priority-weighted well-being is a dimensioned quantity
rather than a dimensionless number. I ignore this complication in what follows.
36. See Bradford Skow, “How to Adjust Utility for Desert,” Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 90 (2012): 235–57, 247.
596 Ethics April 2021grows his for twenty-one years. Ann’s trees will end up, on average, taller
than Bob’s. Since the longer growth periods are just twelve times the
shorter ones, does this mean that the formula for tree growth with re-
spect to time grown presupposes a stronger-than-ratio (i.e., absolute)
scale of temporal duration? Of course not. A month is just as good a unit
of time as a year.
To unpack the analogy a bit more, let h(t) be the height of a tree
grown for time t. It may be tempting to write hðtÞ5 hð0Þ2t . But since t
is a dimensioned quantity, that cannot strictly be correct. It should in-
stead be hðtÞ5 hð0Þ2t=ð1 yearÞ. This introduction of a dimensional con-
stant would be unnecessary if t were treated as a number—that is, time-
in-years rather than time—as the orthodox SWF methodology does with
well-being. But then the formula would not be invariant to changes in the
measure of time, as the example in the previous paragraph illustrates. It
would be absurd to suggest that since the formula would not be invariant
to changes in the measure of time, there must be a single correct unit of
time if a tree really doubles in height every year. The impression of re-
quiring times to have “correct” units only arises from treating times as
having no unit at all—that is, as dimensionless numbers—which effec-
tively regards them as if they were measurable on an absolute scale. Seen
this way, Adler’s rejection of Kolm-Pollak SWFs on the grounds that a ra-
tio scale of welfare requires multiplicative invariance is like insisting
from the armchair that nothing can grow or decay exponentially with
respect to time because temporal duration is no more than ratio-scale
measurable.
We can now see, more generally, why recognizing welfare levels as di-
mensioned quantities allows an SWF to violate multiplicative invariance
even if welfare is only ratio-scale measurable. Consider how Adler moti-
vates multiplicative invariance: “Assume that an SWF ranks outcomes dif-
ferently, depending on whether well-being values are assigned using w(⋅)
or w1(⋅), even though w1(⋅) is a common ratio rescaling of w(⋅). The two
measures contain identical information regarding levels, differences,
and ratios, but the SWF is ‘reading’ the well-being numbers as if they em-
body additional information, and thereby differentiating between w(⋅)
and w1(⋅). This is, intuitively, problematic. What additional well-being in-
formation can there be?” (156). We can now answer this argument. Rec-
ognizing welfare levels as dimensioned quantities allows us to distinguish
two kinds of operations that might be called “common ratio rescalings.”
One is changing the numerical component used to represent a dimen-
sioned quantity of welfare—for example, converting utils to shmutils.
This kind of rescaling involves “multiplying” welfare levels by the conver-
sion ratio k shmutils=1 util5 1. This operation preserves, as Adler says,
all of the information regarding levels, differences, and ratios of well-
being. If the SWF is properly expressed as a function of dimensioned
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not change the ranking of distributions, as we have seen with the Kolm-
Pollak SWF. This is because if w1(⋅) is a “common ratio rescaling” of w(⋅)
in this sense, then w1ð⋅Þ5 wð⋅Þ: the two measures assign the same vectors
of dimensioned quantities to the same outcomes, even if those quantities
are represented in different units (much as 1 kg5 1,000 g). So, of course,
the SWF will rank the resulting vectors the same way.
The second kind of operation is multiplying welfare levels by a di-
mensionless number k ≠ 1. This does not, contra Adler, preserve all
of the information regarding levels and differences: people’s well-being
levels and the differences between them have changed. Then an SWF
that is not multiplicatively invariant, such as the Kolm-Pollak SWF, might
rank distributions differently. But why shouldn’t it? This kind of “com-
mon ratio rescaling” is a real change in well-being, not a mere change
in scale. The absence of a natural unit of well-being gives us no reason
to doubt that such a change could affect the ranking of distributions—
any more than the absence of a natural unit of time gives us reason to
doubt that atoms could decay exponentially with time. It is only because
the SWF tradition represents welfare levels as numbers rather than di-
mensioned quantities that there is any temptation to conflate these two
cases of “common ratio rescalings.”
Adler might insist that all of the relevant information about well-
being levels and differences is preserved by this second kind of “common
ratio rescaling,” because, contrary to the views considered in Section IV,
the only information that could be relevant is captured by ratios. That
may be true. But it does not follow from the mere ratio-scale measurabil-
ity of welfare. Consider an analogy to another dimensioned quantity,
namely, temperature. The Celsius scale assigns the boiling point of water
to 1007.Wemight reasonably care whether some amount of water is above
or below 1007C—say, because wewant the water to boil. Does caring about
such information mean that we must be sensitive to the scale on which
temperature is measured, or that we are bizarrely taking a degree Celsius
to be the correct unit of temperature? Of course not. The Celsius scale is
uncontroversially not an absolute (or even ratio) scale. But that does not
mean that if every object’s temperature-in-degrees-Celsius were doubled
and increased by ten, everything would stand in all of the same relations
that depend in some way on temperature (e.g., being in the same state of
matter).
Multiplicative invariance simply does not follow from Adler’s in-
sight that, since welfare is (at most) ratio-scale measurable, an SWF’s
rankings should be independent of the unit in which well-being is mea-
sured. It only appears to follow when we mistakenly treat the values of
the individual well-being measure as numbers rather than dimensioned
quantities and assume that the SWF contains no dimensional constants.
598 Ethics April 2021Since well-being levels are not numbers, prioritarians and others can rea-
sonably reject multiplicative invariance without being committed to the
existence of an absolute scale or natural unit of well-being. They can do
this by treating welfare levels as dimensioned quantities and thereby dis-
tinguishing between real changes in well-being and mere changes in
scale, without having to change the SWF when well-being is represented
in different units. Of course, there may be other reasons to reject SWFs
that violate multiplicative invariance—for example, because they posit
additional dimensional constants like the Kolm-Pollak SWF’s l or the
critical level c. But proponents of those SWFs were already committed to
such additional parameters; theymay have simply ignored their dimension.VI. CONCLUSION
I am suggesting that Adler and others in the SWF tradition have made
what may seem a simple mistake: they have failed to heed the pedantic
advice of our science teachers, to mind our units. If I am right, then
why has this mistake been so widely made?
One speculative hypothesis is that the treatment of welfare levels as
numbers, rather than dimensioned quantities, is an artifact of the or-
dinalist framework from which much of the SWF literature originally
stems. If well-being were only ordinally measurable, talk of “units” of
well-beingmight seemmisleading. What would be the point of represent-
ing well-being levels in utils, for instance, if 2 utils were not twice the value
of 1 util? It would perhaps seem better to assign numbers without includ-
ing any unit, to avoid the impression of a cardinal or even ratio scale. But
mere ordinal measurability is no justification to treat well-being levels as if
they were dimensionless numbers. The Mohs scale is an ordinal scale of
mineral hardness, but Mohs levels are not numbers; they are levels of
hardness. In any case, those who take welfare to be measurable on a ratio
scale—such as Adler—should find it less tempting to omit units.
Another possibility is that theorists in the SWF tradition have been
under the influence of something like Luce’s “principle of theory con-
struction” in the philosophy of science.37 Luce’s principle says that admis-
sible transformations of independent variables (e.g., ratio rescalings of
the individual welfare measure) should lead to an admissible transforma-
tion of the dependent variable. But Luce himself qualifies this principle
to functional relationships in which there are no dimensional constants.
Luce takes his principle of theory construction, properly understood, to
imply that “psychologists (as well as other scientists)either are restricted to37. See R. Duncan Luce, “On the Possible Psychophysical Laws,” Psychological Review
66 (1959): 81–95.
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sional parameters in the statement of their laws.”38 Multiplicative invari-
ance and other restrictive conditions on the shape of the SWF can be
avoided by including such dimensional constants, which we may have in-
dependent reason to recognize.39
Here I have only drawn out a few consequences of treating well-
being levels as dimensioned quantities. It lets us distinguish real changes
of well-being frommere changes in the unit of measurement, without re-
quiring the SWF to change when welfare is represented on a different
scale. It highlights the importance of dimensional constants for SWFs.
It opens the possibility for welfare levels and differences to have moral
significance beyond the ratios between them, without requiring a privi-
leged, natural unit of well-being. And it would allow Adler to apply a prio-
ritarian SWF to distributions that contain negative welfare levels, without
going beyond a ratio scale. I do not know what other implications this ap-
proach may have for the SWF methodology.38. R. Duncan Luce, “Comments on Rozeboom’s Criticisms of ‘On the Possible Psy-
chophysical Laws,’” Psychological Review 69 (1962): 548–51, 550; emphasis mine.
39. Skow (“How to Adjust Utility for Desert”) suggests that the dimension of social
welfare is distinct from that of individual welfare. This seems plausible because the good-
ness of an individual life does not seem comparable with a distribution of well-being. This
means that even utilitarian SWFs may require a dimensional constant to relate individual
welfare to social welfare.
